The Swedesh Local is reporting that the ruling of the court in the trial of the Pirate Bay has just came out: The Pirate Bay is guilty of the offense of “promoting other people’s infringements of copyright laws”. The Pirate Bay was ordered to pay $3.5 million in damages and each of the four defendants were sentenced to one year in prison.
The actual text of the judgement is not available in English yet. The defendants are also expected to appeal.
A lot of fuss is happening in the UK regarding the legality of Google Street View. Though the service has been out in the US for about two years now, the UK only got it last month. Many people, including Privacy International, believe that that service is illegal in the UK. Google was aware that the original format of the service would have potentially violated UK legislation, but it consulted the ICO which approved the service when Google stated that it will blur the faces of pedestrians and car number plates.
Some people still argue that their privacy is infringed, but do they have any basis for this argument?Â
There are two grounds for suing for the “privacy” violation in the UK, the first is through the Data Protection Act 1998 and the second is through the Article 8 on Privacy of the Human Rights Act 1998.
I will discuss the DPA in this post and will discuss Artile 8 in another post.
Does Google Street View Violate the DPA 1998?
The DPA 1998 covers personal data related to identifiable living persons when processed by a data collector. On its face, Google might fall under the act as it the scope of the act is very wide to include any information related to individual processed in any way using a computer. However, looking closer at the definitions of the these terms might indicate otherwise.
First of all, the personal data (in this case the photograph of the individual and their location when photographed by Google) must ‘relate’ to an identifiable person. The requirement for the info to ‘relate’ to the person is not defined by the act, but the court said in the case of Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 that the mere inclusion of someone’s information in the data is not sufficient for it to ‘relate’ to him. The person must be the ‘focus’ of the  information for it to relate to him and it must affect his privacy whether in his personal, family life, business or professional capacity.
There mere inclusion of someone’s photo on the street in an incidental manner which does not show him as a focus nor affects his privacy in anyway will probably not be held by the court to be falling under the DPA. This means will exclude these pictures from the scope of the act.
In circumstances where a person is the focus of a photograph and the picture shows him in a situation that infringes his privacy that person will be covered by the act if that person is identifiable. Google has tried to blur as many faces as it can. If this person cannot be identified by looking at the picture then that information is not covered by the act. The fact that the person can be identified by using the Google Street View information with other information taken from other sources which help identify the person will not bring the information within the scope of the act.
There are no such thing as the right not have to someone’s house or neighbourhood photographed. The DPA is about personal information and not about owned objects or companies.
Even if someone’s data is considered to fall under the DPA, that does not give them the right to ask for that information to be removed – except in situation of direct marketing or situations where the information causes substantial unwarranted damage or distress.
There is no requirement for a person to ‘consent’ to have his information processed under the DPA if the data collector satisfies any of the conditions of Schedule 2 of the act.
Google’s original form of Street View might have violated the DPA, but their current form with blurred faces and number plates would not violate the DPA if it works correctly to make the individuals unidentifiable. The majority of people photographed in the public not doing anything private would not be subject to the DPA even if there faces were not covered as the information would not be considered to be ‘related’ to them if Durant is to be applied.
(Photo Credits: -12°C)
Data protection law is the law that protects personal information about living individuals in the UK from being processed in anyway by commercial entities. This is governed by the Data Protection Act 1998 in the UK. Members of the EU have country-specific legislation implemented through the Directive 95/46/EC (the Data Protection Directive).
Though technically about data, the data protection law in effect is a privacy legislation that is meant to ensure that private information about people is not misused when collected by companies.Â
The provisions of the DPA 1996 apply when personal information relating to an identifiable individual is processed by a data controller.
Personal data is defined by the act as “data which relate to a living individual”. This can be ANY data which relates to a person such as name and address, health conditions, Â religious beliefs, or any form of recorded information whether textual, visual, etc. Â The exact meaning of “relate” is not explained in the act, but it was discussed in the case of Duran v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746, where the court held that it “is information that affects [the person’s] privacy, whether in his personal or family life, business or professional capacity'” and that it the person must be “the focus rather than some other person” with home the information is concerned.
The personal information must be related to an “identifiable” person who can be identified (a) from the data or (b) from those data and other information which is in possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller. Unlike the EU Directive, the UK act doesn’t cover the incidents where the processed personal data is used along with information held by a 3rd party is combined to identify the person.
 The personal data will only be regulated when it is ‘processed’ by  data controller. This is a very wide term that means obtaining, recording, or holding information or carrying out any operation or set of operations on the information or data, including organisation, retrieval, disclosure, or alignment. The definition used in the act is wide to include every imaginable action you may perform in relationship to data.Â
The law imposes obligations on all “data controllers” – these are natural or legal persons who determine the purpose and means for prosesing the personal data. The law also imposes some additional obligations on a “data processor” – which is the natural or legal persons who processes the data on behalf of the data controller.
Rights for Individuals
If an individual’s personal data has been processed by a data collector, then he has the following rights:
It is possible to claim compensation for the breach of some of the rights mentioned above.
The Data Protection Principles
The act requires all data controllers to abide by eight data protection principles:
The Information Commissioner’s Office is the body responsible for superivsing the adequate compliance by data controllers with the DPA.
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) issues a Manual of Patent Office Practice (MOPOP) to guide applicants on the application procedure. The latest edition of MOPOP has a chapter dedicated to clarify the patentability of Computer Implemented Inventions.Â
The first point emphasised by MOPOP is that Schlumberger, though the only authority on software patents, did not decide that computer implemented inventions are not patentable, but instead held that the introduction of a computer aspect to to the invention does not, by itself, make an invention any more or less patentable, and that a computer implemented invention would have to satisfy all the regular patentability requirements for the application to succeed and must fall within one of the invention categories mentioned in Section 2 of the Patent Act.
On issues of subject matter MOPOP makes it clear that a computer implemented process will only qualify as patentable subject matter upon the satisfaction of two conditions. The first is that the process must be an act or a series of acts performed by some physical agent, upon some physical object and produce in such an object some change either in character or condition. Â The second condition is that the process must produce any essentially economic result relating to trade, industry or commerce.Â
On the application of Subsection 27(8), MOPOP says that a claim to a method consisting only calculations made in accordance to certain formulae is excluded from patentability, because of its lack of any act performed by a physical agent upon some physical object and producing such a change of character or condition in such object. The same method will also not qualify because it does not produce an essentially economic result relating to trade, industry or commerce.
MOPOP states that there are three possible qualifying type of claims for which a computer implemented invention may be successfully patented:
MOPOP also provides examples of how a qualifying claim would be drafted for each of these as well as examples of what would not be accepted as qualifying subject matter.
The MOPOP guidelines themselves seem to be very consistent with the case law and were updated before the more recent liberal decisions taken by BAP.
(Photo Credits:Â Leonard Low)
Software Patents introduce unique problems to the patent system. The main goals of any patent system is to create an incentive and a reward for inventors who create helpful inventions. There is no doubt that the computer software is one of the most important industries in today’s economy. However, they argument as to whether or not they should be patented at all is still hotly debated.Â
Arguments Against Software Patents
There are several grounds for refusing software patents. The first one is that computer software is already protected by copyright. The protection of copyright is automatically granted without any formalities and it grants to the author of the software with the right to prohibit others from copying the way the software is expressed – i.e. the literal copying of the program code. While it is true that copyright’s protection differs from that of patent protection, in that a person can replicate the concept of the software without infringing the copyright if he does not copy the same code, any greater protection would be essence go beyond the expression and into the algorithm and idea behind the software and that should never be subject to patent or copyright protection as the free flow of ideas is necessary for any society to thrive.
Software patents do not easily fit into the patent system because they do not give society much value in return for the patent bargain. The patent system runs on the basis that an inventor would be granted protection for his novel invention upon the disclosure of the workings on the invention. The inventor gets monopoly over the invention and society gets to learn how the invention works through the disclosure. Satisfying this bargain is hard to achieve in the case of software patents because the applicant is never required to disclose the source code of the software, and even if they do, it is impossible for a patent examiner to determine whether this code is sufficient to rework the invention due the massive amount of the code. Â This makes the software patent database available to the public pointless as they cannot learn anything about the invention by analysing the information provided and therefore the bargain is not really balanced.
Another problem with software patents is that they the length of a patent goes way beyond any expected market life of any software. The patent system was invented for “slow” industries for which the 20 year patent term allowed a company to generate a return on investment that covers its research and development costs. It is also likely for the patent subject to be still of commercial value even after the expiry of the term so that competitors can use it and built upon it. This could be not said about software patents as no software would have any value after a 20 years period and it would be very unlikely for society to derive any benefit from the the patent subject after the expiry of the term.
The earlier point is amplified by the fact that a patent application could taken up to 4 years for the patent office to examine it and grant a patent. This does not exceed the average market life of a software, but also subjects other software developers to the danger of unintentional patent infringement as they would not know about the existence even after the software becomes obsolete.
Many also believe that software patents are not necessarily at all to create an incentive for innovating in the software industry. This is apparent from the success of the “open source movement” and the success of a number of business institutions in creating profitable products and services built using open source software. In contrast, patented software is accused of being a cause for the lack of inoperability between different software and hardware and the emergernce of incompatible computing standards.
(Software patents are also very difficult to examine due to the unavailability of a sufficient database, complexity of software code, and the fact that source code is not submitted).
Arguments in Favour of Software Patents
As the industry changes and the world moves away from the ‘mechanical’ industries into digital industries it becomse essential for the patent system to adapt to these changes and provide incentive and reward for influential industries which are of the greatest important to society.Â
TRIPS states that patent protection should be available for inventions in all fields of technology and the software industry is clearly an industry worth protecting.Â
Though copyright may protect the expression of a computer code, this protection does not extend the way in which this code was applied in industry, and that is the protection granted by the patent system. Copyright is effective in protecting against consumer piracy, but it does not protect against the duplication of the invention by a competitor. As the investment in R&D in the software industry grows exponentially, it becomes vital for the state to provide those who invest in this industry of a method for protecting their investment. Trade secrecy is a viable solution only for a small number of business, but it is hard to maintain in large scale operations and in circumstances where the inner workings of the invention can be protected through reverse-engineering.
The available of patents is also helpful for small and medium enterprises who cannot compete with larger companies if their inventions could be easily duplicated without the protection of patents. The successful registration of SMEs is also used by these institutions as a marketing tool to attract capital which is necessary for their businesses to grow and expand.
I think that both sides of the debate have valid points. The software industry should have some protection, but the patent system clearly does not easily accommodate it. At times I think that the solution would be in the creation of a new sui generis type of protection for computer software that involves quicker examination, shorter protection term, and has protections and defences for third party in a manner that serves the software industry as it stands today.
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) is the body responsible for granting patents in Canada, it also issues the Manual of Patent Office Practice (MOPOP) which is used as a guideline for examiners and applicants. Though the courts opinion regarding software patents does not signal in its favour, CIPO has made a number of recent decisions allowing software patents even though it used to also have a strict position against them in the past. The latest edition of MOPOP also has a chapter explaining the requirements for a software patent to succeed.
CIPO Software Patent Decisions
After the Schlumberger court decision, CIPO took a strict position against software patents until 1998 when the Patent Appeal Board decided in favour of two software patent applications. The first is Re Motorala Inc. Patent Application No 2, 085, 228 which involved a device and a method for evaluating exponentials. The claims in the application were originally worded in the format of method claims, later changed in the prosecution stage into apparatus claims. The ‘invention’ was made up of a special software that was coupled with a Read-Only Memory (ROM). CIPO held this to be a qualify invention because of the inclusion of the ROM as a specific part required to run the software:
[T]he Applicant has invented a device which is specifically adapted to carry out the method of solving the algorithm which the Applicant has developed. This device, while it does contain many means-plus-function statements, also includes at least one specific piece of computer hardware which is a real physical element. As a result, the Board believes that the claims of this application go beyond being directed to a mere scientific principle or abstract theorem. The Applicant is not seeking to exclude others from using the algorithm itself but is seeking to exclude others from using the specific device which is claimed.
This decision is a departure from Schlumberger as the question of where the inventiveness lies was never asked, if it were it would be clear that the inventiveness here was in the software and not the hardware nor the combination of both. While the existence of a hardware is necessary for the software to run, this piece of software is generic as any computer program will have to be stored in the ROM of a computer for it to operate, and in fact, the claims of the patent would be infringed if only the software was copied and then was used on any computer as the invention would consequently be worked that way (A5).
While this new approach might be favourable by applicants, it is a departure from case law and might as well be rejected by the court if a case was ever to reach the courts. CIPO held an identical decision also in favour of the applicant in the decision regarding the Re Motorola Inc. Patent Application No. 2,047,731 where the invention related to an apparatus for carrying out a convergence algorithm for use with selected convergence rates which gives improved efficiency on math computation of J-th roots. The software was coupled with a generic piece of hardware and consequently accepted by PAB as a qualifying subject matter that is not a “mere scientific principle or abstract theorem”. It is clear from these two decisions that ANY software could satisfy subject matter requirements by simply coupling it with a generic piece of hardware.
While the Motorala decisions show the general change at CIPO in favour of software patents, other decisions seem to also soften the impact of other cases, such as Progressive Games, which could have an impact on software patents through the exception of games, business methods, and professional skills.
The first example of these new decision is Application No. 2,298,467 which involved a system for facilitating the exchange of data between two computers for the purpose of trading diamonds. The application was rejected by the examiner of several grounds including the fact that this involved a professional skill and a business method, both of which are unpatentable subject matter. The PAB rejected both of these arguments saying that “Professional skill that falls outside the scope of patent protection involves a step in a claimed method which is carried out by a human and which relies on the intelligence and reasoning of the human to make a judgement.”
The PAB avoided discussing the issue on whether or not business methods were patentable at all but stating the the claims fell within the definition of a “machine” and not a business method. This way the other rejections made by the examiner on the grounds of business methods were rebutted.
This of course is a much narrower definition of professional skill than that described in Lawson and requires an actual participation of a human person in the process for it to be disqualified.
Another decision with a similar outcome is the one relating to patent Application No. 2,119,921Â which involved an improvement to a computerised stock trading system for which one of the claims was for displaying and communicating orders to an order entry system of a stock exchange computer. The examiner rejected the application on a number of grounds and one of these was on subject matter on the basis that it was that it related to the automation of features taught by prior art. The PAB rebutted the rejections of the examiner and said that the examiner confused subject matter issues with obviousness when obviousness should not form the basis of a subject matter consideration.
The PAB has also recently showed its willingness to reject the court’s analysis in Progressive Games in the decision of Patent Application 2,220,378 in which the PAB had to decide on the patentability of an application involving systems and methods for group billing in cellular telephone plans. The examiner rejected the application on the grounds of subject matter on the basis that it did “not substantially modify the art of the billing system, nor [does it] create a new or improved billing system” and that it does not “amount to a contribution or addition to the cumulative wisdom of billing systems” – which is the same ground for refusing a process according to Progressive Games.Â
The PAB rebutted the rejection of the examiner stating that subject matter should be examined on its own without taking into consideration issues of novelty, obviousness, and utility and that examination should only decide on whether or not the invention can fall within one of the patentable categories of section 2, namely an art, a process, a machine, a manufacture, or a composition of matter.
This is a very logical explanation of what should be done by CIPO, but CIPO does not have the legal authority to overrule a court decision, which in this instance was clearly disregarded.  It is clear that CIPO is now more willing that ever to allow a software patent to successfully pass on the grounds of subject matter, but that does not meant the court will have the same opinion as CIPO in matters in which the court previously held otherwise.
In addition to the possibility of having an software patent application rejected on the grounds that it was a mere mathematical formula or abstract theorem in accordance with Section 27(8) and Schlumberger, the application might also be rejected for failing to satisfy the subject matter requirements for not being ‘art’ in accordance with section 2.
A computer program could be in essence one relating to a business method or a game, both of which have been rejected by the courts in Canada as qualifying subject matter. A business method or a game could theoretically fall under the definition of the term ‘art’ mentioned as a type of invention in section 2 of the act. In the case of Shell Oil Co v Commissioner of Patents 67 CPR (2d) 1Â the court held that the “word “art” in the context of the definition must be given its general connotation of “learning or knowledge” as commonly used in expressions such as “the state of the art” or the “prior art”“.
This definition had been restricted by the courts in previous decisions to state that the term ‘art’ that do not include “professional skills”. In Lawson v Commissioner of Patents (190). 62 CPR 101 (Ex. Ct.) the court held that a method of describing and laying out parcels of land in a unique shape was not patentable as failing within the skill of a solicitor and conveyancer and that of a planning consultant and surveyor. It therefore rejected the application on the grounds that it involved a professional field and that did not fall within the meaning of section 2.
The case of Tennessee Eastman Co. v Commissioner of Patents (1970) 62  CPR 117 (Ex. Ct.) also had a decision similar to Lawson in that the court held that methods of medical or surgical treatment were also excluded because they were essentially professional skills.
It is worth noting that Lawson also defined “art”:
An art or operation is an act or series of acts performed by some physical agent upon some physical object and producing in such object some change either of character or of condition. It is abstract in that, it is capable of contemplation of the mind. It is concrete in that it consists in the application of physical agents to physical objects and is then apparent to the senses in connection with some tangible object or instrument.
The definition makes it clear that the definition of “art” requires the existence of “physical” tangible aspects for it to qualify which may sound like a very restrictive definition, however, the court later said in the case of Shell Oil Co v Commissioner of Patents (1983) 67 CPR (2d) 1 (SCC) that “‘art’ was a word of very wide connotation and was not to be confined to new processes or products or manufacturing techniques but extended as well to new and innovative methods of applying skill or knowledge provided they produced effects or results commercially useful to the public”.Â
The Shell definition is a much wider one than that of Lawson, but because of the way it was worded, it was understood by the court in the case of Progressive Games, Inc v Commissioner of Patents (1999) 3 CPR (4th) 517 (FCTD) to mean that for a process to be considered an ‘art’ it must:
The case of Progressive Games involved a patent application for a modified version of a poker game which the court held not to be an “art” when applying the Shell Oil test as the game did not amount to “a contribution or addition to the cumulative wisdom on the subject of games” and “do not substantially modify the poker game as it exists nor do they create a new game”.
Progressive Games is another block facing the successful application of software patents as many of them are games or business methods. The new interpretation of Shell Oil in this case makes the satisfaction of subject matter issues a complex matter than requires examining novelty, non-obvious and utility at the same time. This cannot be right because it will give a patent examiner to have a “second kick at the can” for attacking the application based on these separate elements (A6). Some of the steps in the Shell Oil test also create a great level of uncertainty, as they are unlike the real separate stand alone elements, do not have established and clear tests for satisfying each of these steps (A6).
Regardless of the method for reaching the outcome of the case, it is clear from all previous court decisions that the court is not in favor of software and similar patents that do not involve a tangible element as it has never allowed them in all the instances that actually reached the court, even in the last decision of Progressive Games which was decided in 1999.
This dislike of software patents is not shared by CIPO. It will be seen from the upcoming post that CIPO has decided to use its own interpretation to allow some recent software patents to succeed even though they would have been rejected if the same court tests were applied.
The position of the software patents in Canada is not a straightforward one. There is no explicit prohibitions on the patentability of software patents (or business methods) in the Canadian Patent Act, but the only software patent case that ever reached the court decided that software inventions are not patentable. This case was decided in 1981 and the computer and internet revolution has changed the face of Earth since then and there seems to be a general preference for having patents for software in the Canadian Intellectual Property Office  – which indicates in its Manual of Patent Office Practice that a qualify software may be granted a patent. The CIPO did not stop there as it has already allowed the successful application of a number of software patents. CIPO decisions and MOPOP has no legal authority, so the fact that they are granting software patents does not mean that the court will hold them valid if ever challenged.
I will examine in this post the position of the courts and various grounds for which a software patent may be rejected and then will follow that with how CIPO has changed its position over time.
Requirements Under the Patent Act
For a patent application to succeed in Canada it must satisfy the invention subject matter requirements (Section 2), novelty (s28(2)), non-obviousness (s28(3)) and utility (s2).
For application to satisfy the subject matter requirements it must fall within the definition of “invention” in Section 2 of the Act which states that it must be an “art, process, machine or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter”. This definition is subject to sub-section 27(8) which prohibits the grant of a patent for “any mere scientific principle or abstract theorem”.
Novelty is a quantitative criteria of “newness” that requires the invention not to be part of the state of the art at the of filling.  (MOPOP S15.01.01) This basically means that the invention must not have been built, or described in a single document that contained sufficient information to allow another person to make the invention, before the application for the invention was filed.
Non-obviousness is a qualitative criteria of “inventiveness” that requires the invention not to have been obvious to a person of skill in the art at the time of filling. The test of obviousness is whether or not an unimaginative skilled technician would, in the light of the state of the art and common general knowledge at the time of filling date, be led directly and without difficulty to the invention covered by the claim. (MOPOP S15.01.02)
Utility is a requirement for the invention to be “useful” for the purpose for which it was designed. (MOPOP S15 + Progressive Games v COP)
Software patents are usually rejected on subject matter grounds and not on novelty, non-obviousness, or utility, which do not create any software specific problems to the patent application.
General Position of Software Patents – The Schlumberger Case
The only software patent case that reached the courts in Canada is the Schlumberger case (Schlumberger Canada Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents (1981) 56 C.P.R. (2d) 204 (FCA)). The application in this case involved a computer system for the analysis of soil characteristics data for the purpose oil and gas exploration. CIPO rejected the application on the grounds that it was merely a computer program which did not fall under the definition of invention under section 2 of the Patent Act.
The application reached the Federal Court of Appeal which used a two step test to decide whether or not the application should be allowed:
In applying this test the court held that “[w]has is new here is the discovery of the various calculations to be made and of the mathematical formulae to be used in making those calculations. If those calculations were not to be effected by computers but by men, the subject-matter of the application would clearly be mathematical formulae and a series of purely mental operations; as such, in my view, it would not be patentable,” and consequently rejected the application on the grounds of Section 28(3) against the patentability of a “mere scientific principle or abstract theorem”.Â
This court decision made it clear that the mere addition of a computer in a patent application will not change the subject matter of the discovery so as to rescue what is originally unpatentable. A mathematical formula was not allowed to be patentable just because it is processed by a computer.
Though Schlumberger is the only case involving software patents and it was clearly not in favour of allowing software patents, the decision did not prohibit patenting ANY software related invention, but merely one in which “what was discovered” would not be considered as a qualifying subject matter if a computer is or should be used to implement it.
CIPO interpreted this a consequent decision (Application No. 96284) to mean the following:
This summary corresponds with the Schlumberger case as a pure computer program or an invention in which the novelty is in the program are not patentable, while an invention that uses a computer program and has its novel aspect outside the computer program would be patentable.
This position was justified at its time as the software industry was still in its early days and computer hardware was a bigger industry in which innovation was rapidly changing. Research and Development could have been easily protected by the patent system with the Schlumberger decision as the decision allows computer related inventions to be patentable where the innovation is in the apparatus (the hardware) and that adequately protects and promotes this industry.
However, this position is changed now as software is clearly one of the most important industries in world economy and there is a great need to protect and promote the investment in this field. This change in important in software is reflected in more recet CIPO decisions, which are not binding and can be overturned by any court if ever challenged.
But before we turn to the CIPO decision, we should talk in the second post about other more recent additional obstacles that face software patent application as became apparent from business method patent applications, which face a very similar objects at CIPO.
(Baby photo credits: utpal)
An anonymous member called “Boozallen” published a post on Omania2.net defaming the CEO and CTO of Oman Mobile. The CEO complained to the Public Prosecution which took action under Section 61 of the Telecom Law to prosecute the administration of the website.
There are many interesting points in this case, but it is necessary to talk about the facts. On the 20th of August 2008, the offending post was written in English on Omania2.net, but as An Arabic forum, the moderator named Ali Al Zuwaidy temporarily deleted this post on the grounds that it was written in a foreign language, however, after receiving some messages from other members, he unlocked it and made the following post:
Â
أخي الكريم..
قمت ÙÙŠ المرة الأولى بغلق الموضوع بسبب الكتابة باللغة الانجليزية، لكن بعد مراجعة الأمر مع اØد الأخوة قررت ÙØªØ Ø§Ù„Ù…ÙˆØ¶ÙˆØ¹ وابقائه مع دعوة أي شخص لترجمة الموضوع ليتسنى للجميع الاطلاع عليه…
Â
Translation: Generous Brother, I initially locked the topic because the writing was in the English langauge, but after reviewing the issue with one of hte brothers I decided to open it and keep it while inviting any other person to translate the topic so that everyone can view it.
On the 21st of August, the administration of the website decided to remove the thread from the public because of their fear that it offended a website policy on not posting anything that might violate the ruling system of the country.Â
The complaint by Oman Mobile was made after the thread was removed from the forum.
This case is interesting because it probably is the first one to be about a post written in the English language. All previous major cases were written in Arabic, the case is also intereseting because the identity of the original post author was not discovered, and because the action is made against a specific moderator and not the owner or main administrator of the website. The court made the decision to take an action again Ali Al Zuwaidi specifically because he responded to the thread and actively unlocked it after it he locked it before.
The case is currently in progress and the next hearing will be held on the 17th of March.Â
I think that this is a classical case for which Section 61(4) was specifically introduced. Webmasters should be responsible for content published on their website, it is illogical to think that people could simply argue that the post was written by someone else one a  website when they actively maintain as commercial platform for people to post messages for which they have direct control over.  However, the law is unfair because it does not provide a defence for webmasters who take reasonable diligent action to remove defamatory content from their website, which you can argue was the case here as the post was allegedly removed within 24 hours – even though the moderator previously did make an active choice to allow that post on the forum.
If Ali Al Zuwaidi is found guilty he could be prisoned for a period up to a year and fined up to a 1000 Omani Rials.Â
It is worth noting that the Public Prosecution issued a press release today reminding people that sending messages that offen the public order could lead to criminal sanctions.Â
Will be looking forward to see how this case progresses.
Digital Rights Management or DRM are tools used by distributors of digital media to ensure to control the way in which their music, video, and other digital goods are used and distributed. The majority of countries, including Oman, make it a criminal offense to disable DRM, to manufacture or import tools that disable DRM, or to share information to enable others to disable DRM.
Though not strictly speaking an actual substance of copyright, DRM offences are placed in copyright legislation due to their usage in that field. Content distributors use DRM to enforce their copyright by locking down their digital goods. For example, when you download a ringtone from your mobile operator service directly, that ringtone will be equipped with DRM that will not allow you to forward this ringtone to anybody else. If you purchase a DVD, you will not be able to create a copy of it using any legal software in the market. If you rent a video from iTunes, you will not be able to copy that video onto any other machine and you will have a very limited time to watch it after which the video will stop working.
Due to the ease at which copyright work can be copied and distributed over the Internet, one of the industry’s responses to enforce their copyright was the introduction of newer and newer DRM technologies. By using DRM content owners can have almost complete control over the use of the copyright work and will ensure that it is not copied or duplicated easy.
DRM has also contributed to the creation of new business models and services that would not have existed otherwise, for example, it would be impossible to have a legally cheap music rental services such as Napster if it wasn’t for DRM.
The available of DRM also helps the regulation of content through different territories for the protection of children and society when moral values and tolerance of sexual and violent content varies from one distinction to the other as DRM makes it difficult to play American movies in Europe).
However, for the greatest part, most people think that DRM is a bad thing. Starting from the top, there is no evidence that using DRM actually reduces piracy. Steve Jobs himself said in 2007 and DRM does not work. The nature of digital goods makes it impossible to lock down the ability to copy a work because by definition that data must be unlocked to be used and therefore it will always be possible to record and copy that data, whether it digital or analogue format, and then redistribute it. DRM targets the wrong people, people who will pay for it are not the pirates. It is demeaning because it makes every single one of us a suspect of copyright infringement.
A more problematic area of DRM is that it does not only stop illegal copying, but legal copying as well. Copyright is not an absolute right, but one which is supposed to balance the interests of society against those of the author. The collection of these legal copying instances are called in the US “Fair Use” and in Europe “Fair Dealing”. In Oman, these are called “Free Uses” and are specified in Article 20 of the Copyright Law 65/2008. A simple example of these rights are the right to make a single backup copy under Article 20(5). When DRM is used to protect a copyright work, then breaking the protection to create a copy would constitute a criminal offense regardless of whether the DRM was removed to create a legitimate backup copy.
This example could also be illustrated in the case of DVD playback on the Linux OS, no Linux OS has the license to play DVD movies on it, but Article 20(5) allows the modification of a copyright work in order to make a work compatible with another operating system, however, due to the fact that DVD movies are protected by CSS DRM, it will not be possible to make use the format shifting exception to play the DVD on Linux and any attempt to create a tool to play DVDs on Linux, or use one, would constitute a criminal offense under Article 40 of the Copyright Law.
That basically renders all the exceptions of copyright protection pointless as the majority of copyright works can now be DRMed, whether there was or wasn’t a point for using this protection. That obviously cannot be right, as copyright was never meant to grant such a power to content makers to control the way we use content we legally purchased. No legislator anywhere made the conscious decision to introduce such stringent rules, but this change in the way copyright operates was a result in the change of technology, for which copyright law was modified in the WRONG way “adapt” to it.
Not only does DRM not allow for free use exceptions, but it does not take regard of even works in the public domain for which no copyright subsists at all as a protection for DRM is granted whether or not the content it actually protects is in copyright or not.
DRM also poses a number of privacy issues, as at some instances personal data, such as names and credit card details, might be required to be submitted before the digital product is consumed. DRM can also be used to track the way and frequency at which the product is used. DRM proved to also be a possible cause of serious security risk to user computers as was the case in the Sony rootkit music CD fiasco.
The complex structure of today’s market and the way different tools and required to consume media, all make it possible for DRM to be used to affect the secondary market, as content providers may control the way products are played (e.g. DVDs). This could have an impact on competition and may stifle innovation as new technologies cannot be introduced if all current media is locked down to a specific DRM that cannot be legally broken or adapted without the permission of the owner.
The problems with DRM are international, the majority of modern copyright legislation including the US, Japan, and UK all have similar provisions against the circumvention of DRM. The laws in Oman are just as bad, especially as the DRM provisions were introduced in response to comply with the requirements of Article 15.4 of the Free Trade Agreement with the US. Any attempt to remove or amend the bad DRM provisions in Oman could render us in breach of our obligations under the FTA. Our only solace is that the situation in the US (and all other countries that signed an FTA with the US) is just as bad, but that does not really solve the problem.
Luckily, more and more companies seem to know that DRM is not the solution to the problem, iTunes announced a couple of months ago that it will make its entire music catalog without DRM, Amazon has always been so since the day it launched its online music store.
But now having DRM free content seems like a privilege and not a right. An international movement would have take place for the law to change that position.